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Abstract 
The object of this study is to explore the effect of cultural distance on both the long run and short run 
performance of cross border mergers and acquisitions undertaken by Indian acquiring firms. We utilize 
buy and hold returns (BHAR), cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and cross-sectional regression 
analysis in our study. Adopting the traditional Hofstede measure of cultural distance and other pertinent 
variables, commonly used to measure cultural differences, we document a negative and statistically 
significant influence of cultural distance on Indian cross-border M&As and corroborate some of other 
findings reported in prior research. Also, we find that the BHAR is nevertheless higher when the 
acquisitions are friendly, paid for 100% cash, and the acquiring firm is large, older and belongs to a 
business group. The inclusion of the variable ‘business group’ along with industry relatedness and 
acquirer size provides valuable insights into the Indian cross border acquisition landscape, wherein 
business groups dominate to a great extent. 
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Introduction 
Studies on cross-border acquisitions undertaken by acquirers in the two major emerging market economies 
of China and India (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Bhagat, Malhotra & Zhu, 2011;  Boateng, Wang & Yang, 2008; 
Chen and Young, 2010; Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar & Chittoor, 2010; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013; Ning, 
Kuo, Strange & Wang, 2014; Li, Li and Wang, 2016)  report the abnormal returns around the announcement 
of mergers, can be either positive, zero and insignificant or negative. This is not an unexpected result. These 
positive or negative returns from these cross-border mergers depend not only on the choice of target firms 
but also on a host of other factors, both tangible and intangible.  
In a recent issue of The Economist (June 10-16, 2017, page 69), it has been reported that even though the 
smaller acquirers in China have done relatively well, the larger acquirers have been constrained by the State 
authorities and their own inability to assess and implement the necessary integrative strategies in foreign 
target nations. In particular, the subpar performance of the larger acquirers as often reported by the financial 
press may be particularly affected by the cultural distance between the acquiring firms and target firms, 
especially in developed nations. Cultural distance between acquirers and targets has been explored in the 
context of transnational mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as a critical variable that can have significant 
bearing on the eventual success of such cross-border corporate integrations (Datta and Puia, 1995; Lee et 
al., 2008; Leung et al. 2005; Shenkar, 2012;); culture affects the information flow and the learning process, 
each so vital for the success of cross-border mergers (Datta and Puia, 1995; Morosini et al., 1998). 
The object of this study is to explore in particular the effect of cultural distance on both the long run and short 
run performance of cross border mergers and acquisitions undertaken by Indian acquiring firms.  We explore 
in this paper specifically the effect of cultural distance on both long run buy and hold returns and on 
announcement period returns to Indian cross border acquisitions. We examine the influence of several 
measures that codify the cultural distance between acquiring and target firms beyond the Hofstede (1980) 
measure to embody cross country differences in culture.  
We analyze a sample of 141 cross-border acquisitions undertaken by Indian firms between 1995 and 2015.  
As far as we know, this is first time this particular issue with regard to cross border mergers and acquisitions 
undertaken by Indian firms has been empirically explored in the finance literature.    
We find that long run buy and hold returns (BHAR) for various time periods are negative even though the 
announcement period abnormal returns for selected windows are either positive or zero for our sample of 
firms.  BHAR is nevertheless higher when the acquisitions are friendly, paid for 100% cash, and the acquiring 
firm is large, older and belongs to a business group.  The Hofstede measure turns out to be negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level in our study.  The results are more in line with those reported by 
Ahern et al., (2015) and opposite to those reported by Chakrabarti et al., (2009).  Returns to acquiring firms 
are lower when the cultural distance between the acquiring and target firms is greater.  However, we are able 
to document and corroborate patterns of influence on the long-term performance of Indian cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions that have been earlier reported by Ahern et al., (2015) for a global sample of 
acquiring firms.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the links between cultural distance and firm 
performance and develops the hypotheses for the study.  Data, variables and methodology used for the study 
are described in Section 3. The results for the study are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
Literature Review  
Culture and its effects on cross-border M&A performance 
Culture, according to Hofstede et al., (2010), “consists of unwritten rules of the social game. It is the collective 
programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others.” 
Further they show that national culture explains the differences in manager’s attitude and value system.  
Evans et al., (2002) show that managers are more sensitive to cultural issues for international acquisition as 
compared to domestic acquisition. Morosini and Singh (1994) conjecture that the acquirer would choose the 
most appropriate post-acquisition integration strategy if the firm knows how the national culture would 
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influence the target. Weber et al. (1996) show that critical factor for the success of international M&A is the 
difference in national culture rather than the corporate culture. Zhao et al., (2004) theorize the role of culture 
in determining the transaction costs associated with cross-border mergers. Slangel (2006) posit that the 
cultural distance works as a boon (a bane) if the level of integration between acquirer and the target is low 
(high). Hence, even though a large body of evidence indicates that cultural distance increases the cost of 
integration and negatively affects firm performance, cultural distance may, under certain scenarios, also 
enhance the potential synergies through capability building and resource sharing (Mayrhofer, 2004). 
Though wider gaps in culture, either national or corporate, between the acquiring and target firms is often 
attributed to as one of the primary reasons for which cross border acquisition usually fail (Datta & Puia, 1995; 
Stahl & Voigt, 2008), there is a countervailing argument which posits that when such wide gaps do exist, 
acquiring firms undertake the strictest of due diligence before they embark upon such cross border 
acquisitions and  the extra care they undertake before extending offers for targets often leads to superior 
outcomes after the acquisitions (Morosini & Singh, 1994). Culturally distant mergers can often lead to 
innovation and learning in an environment where participants, faced with uncertainties, are prepared to break 
new grounds (Very, Lubatkin & Calori, 1996).  The awareness of the cultural distance often motivates the 
participants to enforce better integration measures that results in superior post-merger performance (Goulet 
& Schweiger, 2006). Thus, larger distances between the cultures of acquiring and target firms in the context 
of cross border M&As need not necessarily lead to negative outcomes for the participating firms; they can 
drive positive post-merger outcomes as well.   
Even though empirical research on cross border mergers has been extensive, comprehensive studies 
examining the effect of cultural differences on the post-merger performance of acquiring firms in the context 
of cross border mergers and acquisitions have been relatively few.  Ahern et al. (2015) examine a global 
sample of 827 acquiring firms for the period 1985 through 2008 from 35 different countries that have engaged 
in cross border M&A acquiring targets in 38 countries, and have reported that the volume of cross border 
mergers and the combined announcement returns to both the acquiring and target firms are lower when the 
countries involved in the M&A are culturally more distant.  Ahammad et al. (2016) have also reported that 
cultural differences have a negative influence on cross-border acquisitions.  
On the other hand, Chakrabarti et al. (2009), using a global sample of over 800 acquisitions during the period 
1991-2004 have reported that cross border acquisitions undertaken by firms across a wide spectrum of 
nations performed relatively better when the culture of the acquiring firm differed markedly from that of the 
target firms.  Contrary to normal expectations, they find a positive relation between cultural distance and long 
run post-merger M&A performance. Using a survey methodology, Morosini et al. (1998), also find a positive 
relation between cultural distance and post-merger performance for a sample of 52 cross border acquisitions 
undertaken between 1987 and 1992.  Dikova and Sahib (2013) have reported for a 2009-10 global sample 
of firms that more internationally experienced acquirers are able to better manage cultural differences in 
cross-border acquisitions. Lack of experience in culturally distant cross border acquisitions initiated by novice 
acquirers can thus lead to lower post-merger performance. 
Cultural distance and its effects on Indian acquiring firms 
The Indian firms are new in the realm of cross border mergers and that several acquiring firms in India are 
dominated by insiders makes the study of the effect of cultural distance on the performance of cross border 
merger distinctly unique. In India, insiders are called promoters and they are either an individual or groups of 
individuals. Relatives of the promoter and other associates form the promoter group. Promoter is a person 
who brings about the incorporation and organization of a corporation and retains the overall control of the 
company.  Indian promoters have dominated the corporate sector ever since India became a sovereign 
nation in 1947 and continue to hold, on average, the largest share blocks in the companies they own and 
control. 
On the other hand, firms are predominantly owned by insiders in India and are therefore expected to be very 
conservative in their approach to foreign acquisitions. They are also likely to tightly integrate the target into 
their own firms once they do engage in cross border acquisitions. Indian corporate insiders, who normally 
would prefer to engage in domestic mergers, would be more cautious in venturing into cross border mergers 
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but once they do commit to a cross border merger they would be expected to channel more focused attention 
and higher amounts of resources to make the cross border mergers work. Cultural distance between 
acquirers and targets might motivate the involved firms to commit to a greater degree of commitment to make 
the post-merger integration process work.   
Also, India being a diverse country in terms of culture, firms in India are accustomed to a degree of internal 
corporate cultural distance in terms of their domestic operations. Unlike the United States, operating working 
cultures of different states in India vary appreciably but there is uniformity in the ways national culture 
influences corporate values in India.  Even though there is some homogeneity in terms of national culture in 
India, corporate culture varies between the states substantially; managers are exposed and are acutely 
sensitive to variations in local cultures in India.  So, whether the evidence pertaining to the effects of culture 
on merger valuations with regard to Indian acquiring firms will align itself with those reported by Ahern et al., 
(2015) or with those documented by Chakrabarti et al., (2009) is an empirical issue. Also, both Ahern et al.  
(2015) and Chakrabarti et al (2009) have looked into samples where the acquirers belong predominantly to 
the developed nations with higher per capita GDP as compared to their targets. In our case we try to explore 
whether cultural distance plays a similar role when acquiring firms from a lower per capita GDP country like 
India acquire targets in nations with higher per capita GDP. 
Empirical evidence on cross-border M&A undertaken by Indian firms and the economic rationale for 
cross-border M&A. 
The valuation effects of cross border mergers around the announcement of mergers undertaken by Indian 
acquirers have been examined in the financial literature (Gubbi et al. 2010; Kohli & Mann, 2011; Pradhan & 
Abraham, 2005; Chakrabarti, 2008; Zhu & Malhotra, 2008).  On average, the announcement period returns 
to Indian acquirers in the context of cross-border mergers are positive. Recently, Indian acquiring firms have 
aggressively resorted to cross border acquisitions in order to internationalize their respective operations (Sun 
et al., 2012), and often these acquiring firms have ventured into unchartered territories wherein the culture 
of the target firms varied widely - either at the firm level or at the national level - from their own. Prior research 
(reviewed in Banerjee et al., 2014) finds that Indian firms do relatively well, in generating value for their 
shareholders, upon acquiring domestic firms. Indian acquirers realized, on average, positive returns for their 
shareholders.  This evidence stands in stark contrast with existing research on profitability of acquisitions by 
firms in developed nations (Moeller et al., 2004) and of cross border acquisitions by firms in developed 
nations (Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005, and Cakici et al., 1996); the results consistently show that acquiring 
firms post either negative or zero abnormal returns around the announcement of mergers. Therefore, at first 
sight it is puzzling that Indian acquirers make profitable acquisitions while their Western counterparts do not. 
Hypotheses for the study 
Our study examines three research questions. First, whether the acquirers from an emerging economy like 
India can create long-term value for their shareholders through cross border M&A. Second, whether the 
cultural distance between India and the target nations can play any significant, discriminating role in the value 
creation. Third, whether the absorptive capacity of the Indian acquiring firms has any role to play in influencing 
the relationship between value created in cross-border mergers and the cultural distance between acquirers 
and targets. Absorptive capacity refers to identification of new information and taking such information into 
consideration in order to make commercial gains (Zahar and George, 2002; Tzokas et al. 2015). Emerging 
economy firms are in the early stage of their internationalization process and may not be able to manage the 
complex strategic assets acquired through cross-border mergers. Therefore, they need to build the 
absorptive capability to overcome this shortcoming and become successful in cross-border acquisitions.  We 
utilize three firm specific variables to proxy for the absorptive capacity of Indian acquirers: (a) size of the 
acquiring firms; (b) industry relatedness; (c) whether the acquiring firms belong to a business group in India.    
H1: The long-term buy and hold returns to Indian acquiring firms from cross-border mergers will be positive.  
Cultural distance is a measure of difference of culture of two countries and the genesis of this difference 
could be from different sources like history, geographical climate, religion and language (Raid and Vaara, 
2011).  Like Chakrabarti et al., (2009), we utilize the Hofstede measure to differentiate the cultural difference 
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between two nations. The Hofstede cultural dimension is a quantitative construct based on five attributes: 
power distance, individualism vs. collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity vs. femininity 
considerations and long-term-short-term orientation.  Researchers have also adapted other measures to 
gauge the cultural distance.  The GLOBE project (Global Leadership and organizational Behavior 
Effectiveness) database has also been used by scholars to measure cultural distance.  As far as acceptability 
is concerned, the Hofstede measure is widely used in different streams of management studies (Spector et 
al., 2001; Sivakumar and Nakata, 2001, Kirkman et al., 2006; Chakrabarti et at., 2009). Culture theorists 
propose that cultural difference matter in international business; it negatively affects the post-acquisition 
integration process (Reuer and Koza, 2000), and this can result in a negative impact on value creation for 
acquiring firms in the context of cross-border mergers (Hofstede et al. 2010, p.408-409). So, we expect 
cultural distance to affect long-term buy and hold returns negatively. 
H2: The greater the cultural distance between India and a target firm’s country, the lower will be the long run 
buy and hold returns to Indian acquiring firms. 
Some firm specific characteristics may mitigate the negative impact of cultural distance. Usually, larger firms 
have more resources in terms of financial and personnel which they can use for better adaptive purpose 
(training and development).  Li et al. (2016) find that the larger firms are less affected by the cultural distance. 
Size of the acquirer can have a negative relationship with the returns to cross-border acquisition 
announcements (Bertrand and Bestchinger, 2012), the effect being attributed to hubris on the part of 
acquiring firm mangers (Roll, 1986).  
Nevertheless, we expect the size of the Indian acquirers to have a mitigating effect on the negative impact 
of cultural distance. 
H3A: The negative impact of cultural distance on long run buy and hold returns to Indian acquirers from 
cross-border mergers will be lesser for larger acquiring firms 
Acquiring target firms in related industries entail lower cost of integration as there would be potentially higher 
cultural, technological and strategic alliance between the acquiring firms and the targets. The firms from 
emerging markets try to find the horizontal acquisitions to achieve larger benefits through accessing the 
complementary assets (Athreye and Godley, 2009). Li et al., (2016) have also found that the acquisitions in 
related industries are found to be less affected by the cultural distance. This implicitly implies the importance 
and applicability of learning and absorptive capacity.  
In the case of unrelated acquisitions, this cultural distance promotes the scope for developing knowledge, 
new experimentation in terms of new markets, new products and new resources (Gavetti and Levinthal, 
2000), such unrelated expansions nevertheless increase risk and the probability of failure (Pennings et al., 
1994). So, when Indian acquiring firms acquire targets in related industries, we expect the negative effects 
of cultural distance to be lesser.  
H3B:  The negative impact of cultural distance on long run buy and hold returns to Indian acquirers from 
cross-border mergers will be lesser for firms acquiring targets in related industries 
Ownership structure plays a very important role in governance mechanisms of firms; it influences strategic 
decision making and shareholder’s value creation. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Chari et al., (2010) show 
that the ownership structure has a role in absorptive capability and firms with superior ownership advantages 
have higher prospect for value creation when they undertake cross-border acquisitions. 
Concentrated ownership structure is quite common among the firms in emerging markets. Even though 
effective legal protection and external governance is very week in such firms (La Porta et al. 1997, Masulis 
et al. 2007), concentrated shareholdings may in fact reduce the extent of managerial discretion (Dharwadkar 
et al. 2000). Controlling shareholders have an incentive to monitor managers, collect information and take 
the risk of pursuing aggressively new ventures through cross-border acquisitions. (La Porta et al. 1999). 
In India, the concentrated ownership is prevalent in the form of business groups. Khanna and Rivkin (2006) 
define a business group as “a set of firms which, though legally independent, are bound together by a 
constellation of formal and informal ties and are accustomed to taking coordinated action.” The resource-
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based view of the firm attempts to link business group with group specific resources (Chang and Hong, 2000). 
Gubbi et al. (2010) show that business group can create their own internal markets and can substitute their 
financial, technological and personnel resource deficiencies through intra group training program, 
reallocating funds and technologies. As a result, they may overcome the institutional emptiness by creating 
their own internal system (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Khanna and Palepu, 2010). This availability of 
internal resources provides them with superior access and makes them more capable of capacity creation 
and being internationally competitive. 
Beule and Sels (2016) find that Indian business group firms have positive impact on shareholder’s value in 
case of cross-border acquisitions. As such we would expect that the negative effect of cultural distance on 
long run buy and hold returns to cross-border acquisitions will be less when the acquiring firm belongs to a 
business group in India.  
H3C: The negative impact of cultural distance on long run buy and hold returns to Indian acquirers from 
cross-border mergers will be lesser for acquiring firms belonging to a business group 
Methodology, Data and Variables  
Methodology & Data 
A research methodology very similar to that of Chakrabarti et al. (2009) is adopted but we extend their 
approach by including additional explanatory variables obtained from the World Bank database and 
Kurtzman, Yago & Phumiwasana, (2004).  The influence of business group on firm performance and decision 
making is an important issue for Indian firms. These groups of firms are linked with common bank, interlocking 
directorships and cross holdings of equity (Khanna and Rivkin, 2006). Since, Indian business groups are 
generally known to be more concerned about power and control than creating value (Manos et al., 2007), 
the influence of the variable ‘business group’ along with industry relatedness and acquirer s ize are also 
explored in this study. The long-term equity performance of companies is measured by the annualized buy-
and-hold-return (BAHR) and short-term performance is measured using cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). 
CARs are determined using standard event study approach. We employ cross-sectional regression model in 
our analysis.   
The original sample of cross-border mergers and acquisitions undertaken by Indian acquirers between 1995 
and 2015 was compiled from the Thomson One Mergers and Acquisition database.  
The following screening criteria was applied to the original sample. 
a) The acquisitions had to be completed. 
b) The acquiring firm was of Indian origin and the target was foreign whose country of origin was known. 
c) After the transaction, the acquiring firm owned at least 25% stake in the target firms. 
d) The acquiring firm was a publicly traded firm for which returns data were available on the Prowess 
database resulting in 431 observations. 
We obtain monthly returns data from the Prowess database for the Indian acquiring firms and calibrate as 
month zero the month in which the cross-border acquisition is announced. To remove the possibility of 
confounding effects in the returns data, we exclude, as in Chakrabarti et al. (2009), acquirers which undertook 
multiple cross-border acquisitions within a three-year period resulting in 395 observations. Finally, we screen 
out all the firms for which the market value information was unavailable resulting in 214 observations. Finally, 
we screen out the firms for which rest of the variables information was not available resulting in the final 
sample of 141 observations. 
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Table 1: Distribution of targets firm’s nation 
Target 
Nations 
No. of 
Acquisitions 
Australia 2 
Belgium 2 
Denmark 2 
Egypt 2 
Germany 11 
Hong Kong 1 
Indonesia 5 
Israel 2 
Italy 4 
Malaysia 3 
Portugal 1 
Singapore 9 
South Africa 5 
South Korea 2 
Spain 3 
Sweden 3 
Switzerland 2 
Thailand 4 
United 
Kingdom 
31 
United States 47 
Total 141 
 
Variables 
Five categories of variables are included in this study: Firm and deal specific characteristics, country level 
characteristics, the Hofstede measure, variables related to Opacity premium (discount), and the Ease of 
doing business variables. We describe the variables in Appendix I.   
We estimate (but do not report explicitly) variance inflation factors (VIF) for all the variables of interest in all 
the tests conducted in this paper and find that multi-collinearity is not a potential concern. The maximum 
value of VIF for any variable in any of these tests is 4.25. 
Empirical Results and Discussion  
Table 1 presents the distribution of target firm nations for the 141 cross-border acquisitions. Target firms are 
predominantly located in developed nations. Nevertheless, despite being relatively new to the cross-border 
acquisitions realm, Indian firms have spread themselves well in terms of buying assets in both developed 
and developing economies of the world. The large number of acquisitions in the United States can be 
explained by the fact that primarily Indian information technology firms acquired targets in the United States. 
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Table 2: Annual Distribution of acquisitions 
Year No. of Acquisitions 
1995 4 
1996 0 
1997 0 
1998 1 
1999 3 
2000 8 
2001 5 
2002 3 
2003 9 
2004 11 
2005 16 
2006 19 
2007 21 
2008 10 
2009 4 
2010 10 
2011 8 
2012 7 
2013 2 
2014 0 
2015 0 
Total 141 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of cross border M&A by year. Cross border M&A by Indian acquirers peaked 
in 2007 when the global financial crisis hit and has steadily declined since then with no recorded cross border 
M&A in 2014 and 2015. We do not consider any acquisition for these two years in our analysis since we try 
to avoid any confounding effect of multiple acquisition within three years period and our dependent variable 
is 3 years BHAR. 
A point to note is that even though the global statistics for cross border M&A were not so strong in 2010, 
Indian acquirers acquired more targets in 2010 than in 2009. 
Table 3 lists the distribution of friendly/hostile and cash/non-cash mergers. Ninety eight percent of cross-
border mergers undertaken by Indian acquiring firms are friendly and sixty two percent are cash mergers.  
Like other global samples, cross border mergers undertaken by Indian acquirers are primarily friendly. 
Operationally, hostile bids for a cross border target would be a rare event for Indian acquirers.  However, that 
38 percent of the mergers are not wholly cash offer mergers indicates that a good number of the mergers 
involved stock offers. Indian corporate laws permit foreigners to hold equity stakes in Indian firms with some 
restrictions. In the absence of definitive data, we conjecture that several cross-border mergers undertaken 
by Indian acquirers involved stock offerings as part of the transactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
   Tewari et al. / International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Vol 8 No 4, 2019 
  ISSN: 2147-4486 
Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders. 
 
P
ag
e2
9
 
P
ag
e2
9
 
P
ag
e2
9
 
Table 3: Deal specific descriptive statistics 
  Number Percentage 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
141 100 
Friendly 138 98 
Hostile/Neutral 3 2 
Cash 88 62 
Unspecified/Non-Cash 53 38 
Friendly vs. Hostile/Neutral and Cash vs. Unspecified/Non-
cash are deal specific characteristics. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for the 
acquiring firm after the acquisition 
  BHAR(12) BHAR(24) BHAR(30) BHAR(36) 
No. of 
observations 
141 141 141 141 
Mean (%) -17.84 -15.56 -15.15 -14.34 
Median (%) -16.28 -12.29 -9.87 -12.5 
Maximum 138.02 95.59 89.06 69.66 
Minimum -284 -149.39 -144.75 -112.89 
St. Deviation 67.18 44.42 39.11 33.34 
P Value 0 0.31 0.03 0.12 
BHAR is 12, 24, 30, and 36 month buy and hold excess return following the 
date of acquisition. 
 
Table 4 lists the distribution of 12, 24, 30 and 36 month buy and hold returns (BHAR) for the sample.  By 
using BHAR we try to capture the long run performance of the acquiring firms. The mean and median BHAR 
are negative for the sample. This is opposite of results reported by Banerjee et al. (2014) who have reported 
positive BHAR for a sample of acquisitions dating from 1995 to 2011. For our sample, the post-merger 
performance of cross-border mergers has not been positive on average but there is wide variation in the 
BHAR which gradually increases over time.  Also, the standard deviation of the returns declines over time. It 
is high for the first 12 months but declines sharply over the remaining 24 months of the 36 month period. The 
results suggest that the Indian acquirers are not creating long-term value for their shareholders in case of 
cross-border acquisitions. 
Table 5 lists the descriptive statistics of variables related to acquirer and target nation for our sample of 141 
Indian cross-border acquirers between 1995 and 2015.  
We then present the results of the multivariate regression analysis in Table 6 with the dependent variable 
being the 36 month post-acquisition BHAR and the independent variables are either only deal-specific (Model 
1) or deal specific and relative country-specific economic measures of the target firms combined (Model 2).  
We report the result for two models: One using only the deal specific variables and the other using all the 
variables. The two deal specific variables, log of the acquiring firm’s market value and the dummy variable 
for cash mergers are negative but statistically insignificant. Age of the acquiring firms is positive and 
significant at the 5 percent level.  The dummy variables for friendly mergers and business group affiliation 
are each positive but statistically insignificant. As per Chakrabarti et al. (2009) firms which undertake friendly 
cross-border mergers and pay cash for them do better in the long run.  We are unable to corroborate that 
finding for Indian firms. The influence of acquirer size was not statistically significant in the study by 
Chakrabarti et al. (2009) and we are corroborating this result in our study. 
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In Model 2, the business group variable is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level indicates 
that if the acquiring firms belong to a business group, they are likely to post higher post-merger BHAR. Of 
the fourteen target firm country-level characteristics we included as independent variables in Model 2, 
unrelated diversifications (negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level) are likely to post lower 
post-merger BHAR.  Thus, larger acquiring firms and acquisitions of targets in unrelated industries are 
yielding lower long-term buy and hold returns whereas acquiring firms belonging to a business group are 
posting higher BHAR.  
The coefficient for the differences in per capita income between the acquiring and target firms is positive but 
statistically insignificant. Thus, when an acquiring firm in India acquires a target in a nation that has a per 
capita GDP smaller than that of India’s, the post-merger acquisition performance is better.  A similar result 
was reported by Chakrabarti et al. (2009) for a global sample of acquirers.  The coefficient for the openness 
of the target firm’s nation is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Whereas the coefficient 
for the difference in corporate governance and the Hofstede measure are negative and statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level. The Hofstede measure was reported as positive by Chakrabarti et al. (2009). We are 
thus reporting a negative influence of cultural distance on long-term performance of Indian acquiring firms, 
similar to the results reported by Li et al, (2016) for Chinese acquirers. 
The Hofstede measure is negative and significant at the 1 percent level in our study, confirming the premise 
that larger cultural distance between the Indian acquiring firms and the nations of target firms do not 
contribute to better post-merger performance, a result that stands in contrast to those reported earlier by 
Chakrabarti et al., (2009). Thus, for Indian acquiring firms, it appears cultural distance diminishes the post- 
merger performance of acquiring firms and this result is statistically significant.  As noted earlier, Indian 
mangers have exposure to cultural diversity in relation to domestic acquisitions.  There is a prior mindset 
which might be expected to contribute to higher returns when exposed to greater cultural distance in cross 
border acquisitions.  Evidently it does not. 
 As has been noted earlier in prior research, statistical significance between deal specific and country wide 
economic variables and post-merger performance is not sufficient to arrive at meaningful conclusions about 
the effect of cultural distance on post-merger performance.  Culture is a complex matrix of attributes and 
measures of it in economic analysis cannot fully capture the influence of culture on the success or failures of 
mergers, which as a concept, as has been pointed out by Hofstede himself, needs more critical scrutiny.  Yet, 
we feel we have demonstrated an important divergence between what has been reported as a positive 
relation for a global sample of firms is not valid for a sample of Indian acquirers.  However, the results being 
reported in our paper is in line with what has been reported by Ahern et al., (2015). 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of variables related to acquirer and target nation 
  Acquirer MV 
($mill) 
Age 
(Years) 
PCI 
Diff 
Openness 
Target 
Forex 
Volatility 
Corp Gov. 
Diff 
Hofstede 
Mean 53,185 32.6 -0.9 0.79 0.48 1.06 16.83 
Median 5,976 23 -0.96 0.54 0 0 16.42 
Maximum 1,081,575 130 -0.32 4.4 15.69 5 24.71 
Minimum 25 5 -0.98 0.22 0 0 11.06 
Std Dev. 151,505 24.11 0.15 0.94 2.42 1.52 2.61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Tewari et al. / International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Vol 8 No 4, 2019 
  ISSN: 2147-4486 
Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders. 
 
P
ag
e3
1
 
P
ag
e3
1
 
P
ag
e3
1
 
Table 5: Continued… 
  Deleterious 
Economic 
Policy 
Efficiency of 
Legal System 
Inadequate 
accounting 
Governance 
Practice 
Trading 
Across 
Borders 
Getting 
Credit 
Enforcing 
Contracts 
Mean 29.48 18.94 28.38 17.27 42.1 27.48 38.15 
Median 27 19 22 13 35 19 21 
Maximu
m 
90 54 63 51 157 97 170 
Minimum 3 3 17 10 1 2 1 
Std Dev. 12.95 11.84 11.24 10.38 28.94 29.06 39.1 
 
Of the five input variables representing the Opacity Index, the coefficients for the Corruption Median and 
Governance Practice are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Whereas, Deleterious 
Economic Policy and Efficiency of Legal System are negative and significant at the 1 percent level as well. 
The coefficient for the Inadequate Accounting Variable is positive but not statistically significant.  
The three variables we included to measure the ease of doing business in a target country are all statistically 
significant. Coefficients for Enforcing Contracts and Getting Credit are positive and significant at the 1 percent 
level whereas coefficients for Trading Across Borders is negative and significant at the 1 percent level.  
Evidently, favorable norms within the target firm nations contribute positively to BHAR even though barriers 
to cross border trade still do persist. 
To gain further insight into the moderating effects of acquire size, acquisition of targets in related industries 
and acquiring firms belonging to a business group, we explore the interaction of each of these variables with 
the Hofstede measure by three separate models and the results are reported in Table 7.  The coefficients for 
the Business group variable is positive in Models 1 and 2 but negative in Model 3, but statistically significant 
in all three models. The coefficient for the Related variable is negative in all three models but statistically 
significant only in Models 1 and 3.  The coefficient for the size variable is negative and statistically insignificant 
in all three models. The interaction between the business group variable and the Hofstede measure (Model 
3) is the only influence that is statistically significant. The coefficient is positive and significant at the 5 percent 
level. In table 6, the coefficient for the business group dummy variable was also positive.  Evidently, acquiring 
firms belonging to a business group mitigate the negative effect of cultural distance on long buy and hold 
returns in the context of cross-border mergers.  
 
Table 6: Regression analysis with Buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) as the dependent 
variable for Indian acquirers 
Independent Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
CONSTANT -0.171 -0.71 2.337*** 4.07 
FRIENDLY_DUMMY 0.075 0.70 0.403* 1.70 
CASH_DUMMY -0.080 -1.41 -0.083 -1.56 
LOG(ACQUIRER_MV) -0.019 -1.17 -0.013 -0.75 
AGE 0.002** 2.14 0.002* 1.67 
BUSINESS_GROUP 0.107 1.57 0.166** 2.39 
RELATED   -0.132** -2.09 
PCI_DIFF 
  
1.221 0.44 
OPENNES_TARGET   1.153*** 3.62 
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FOREX_VOLATILITY   -0.038 -0.64 
CORP_GOV_DIFF 
  
-2.405*** -4.28 
LOG(HOFSTEDE)   -13.696*** -4.30 
CORRUPTION_MEDIAN   6.365*** 3.35 
DELETERIOUS_ECONOMIC_POLICY   -0.238*** -3.95 
EFFICIENCY_LEGAL_SYSTEM   -0.052*** -3.05 
INADEQUATE_ACCOUNTING   0.038 1.45 
GOVERNANCE_PRACTICE   0.671*** 4.00 
TRADING_ACROSS_BORDERS   -0.110*** -4.12 
GETTING_CREDIT   0.032*** 3.94 
ENFORCING_CONTRACTS   0.164*** 4.11 
TARGET COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS YES  YES  
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS YES  YES  
R-sq (%) 33.76  48.64  
Durbin-Watson Stat. 2.00  2.67  
No. of Observations 141   141   
*** denotes significance at 1%, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance 
at 10% level. 
 
Table 7: Multivariate regression analysis with BHAR as dependent variable for Indian acquirerers 
Independent Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
CONSTANT 2.86*** 4.21 2.916*** 4.11 2.699*** 4.44 
FRIENDLY_DUMMY 0.353 1.40 0.344 1.58 0.281 1.40 
CASH_DUMMY -0.086 -1.59 -0.095* -1.78 -0.067 -1.28 
LOG(ACQUIRER_MV) -0.193 -0.68 -0.016 -0.88 -0.013 -0.71 
AGE 0.002* 1.77 0.002* 1.75 0.003** 2.33 
BUSINESS_GROUP 0.169** 2.43 0.162** 2.31 -3.066** -2.23 
RELATED -0.137** -2.17 -1.764 -1.05 -0.136** -2.23 
PCI_DIFF 1.478 0.54 1.039 0.40 2.125 0.79 
OPENNES_TARGET 1.079*** 3.18 1.182*** 3.47 0.759** 2.22 
FOREX_VOLATILITY -0.032 -0.57 -0.039 -0.71 -0.026 -0.50 
CORP_GOV_DIFF -2.309*** -4.01 -2.477*** -4.19 -2.032*** -3.84 
LOG(HOFSTEDE) -13.787*** -4.40 -14.497*** -4.25 -12.532*** -4.30 
LOG(HOFSTEDE)*LOG(ACQUIRER_M
V) 
0.064 0.65     
LOG(HOFSTEDE)*RELATED   0.583 0.98   
LOG(HOFSTEDE)*BUSINESS_GROUP     1.148** 2.36 
CORRUPTION_MEDIAN 6.183*** 3.27 6.569*** 3.43 5.571*** 3.17 
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DELETERIOUS_ECONOMIC_POLICY -0.232*** -3.84 -0.240*** -3.92 -0.212*** -3.79 
EFFICIENCY_LEGAL_SYSTEM -0.049*** -2.74 -0.053*** -3.08 -0.026 -1.32 
INADEQUATE_ACCOUNTING 0.041 1.56 0.036 1.41 0.046* 1.82 
GOVERNANCE_PRACTICE 0.647*** 3.80 0.692*** 3.96 0.554*** 3.46 
TRADING_ACROSS_BORDERS -0.107*** -3.96 -0.114*** -4.12 -0.095*** -3.79 
GETTING_CREDIT 0.030*** 3.44 0.032*** 3.81 0.022** 2.53 
ENFORCING_CONTRACTS 0.159*** 3.91 0.169*** 4.08 0.137*** 3.60 
TARGET COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS YES  YES  YES  
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS YES  YES  YES  
R-sq (%) 48.98  49.48  51.04  
Durbin-Watson Stat. 2.26  2.26  2.26  
No. of Observations 141   141   141  
*** denotes significance at 1%, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% 
level. 
Table 8: Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) 
Window CAAR Pos : 
Neg 
Patell z Prob. Sign t-test Prob. 
(-30,30) 0.02 70 : 71 0.91 0.36 0.69 0.49 
(-2,2) 0.03 90 : 51 5.38*** 0.00 4.07*** 0.00 
(-5,5) 0.03 81 : 60 3.08*** 0.00 2.55*** 0.01 
*** denotes significance at 1% 
 
In our study we have so far concentrated on examining the effects of cultural measures on long-term returns 
of Indian acquiring firms.  The emphasis on long-term buy and hold returns is what differentiates our study 
from previous studies which have explored the effect of culture on cross border announcement period 
returns. Nevertheless, we do examine the relationship between cultural distance and cumulative 
announcement period abnormal returns.  Table 8 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) 
for various windows surrounding the announcement date of the merger.  The CAAR for the (-2, +2) and (-5, 
+5) windows are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  This result corroborates earlier 
findings for Indian cross border mergers: Indian cross border mergers post positive announcement period 
abnormal returns (see Banerjee et al., 2004 for a review of the evidence) whereas global samples have 
recorded negative or zero abnormal returns (Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005; Erel, Liao & Weisbach, 2012).  
Thus, we are corroborating the announcement period returns results for Indian acquirers that have been 
reported in earlier studies.  The (-30, +30) CAARs are positive but statistically insignificant.  Li et al, (2016) 
have also reported positive CAARs for a sample of Chinese acquiring firms that have engaged in cross-
border mergers. 
Table 9 replicates the regression analysis as described in Table 6 but the dependent variable in this case is 
the CAAR for the (-2,+2) window instead of the 36 month post-acquisition BHAR. For model 1, the coefficient 
for the log of the acquirer’s market value is statistically significant at the 1 percent level but negative. So, it is 
the smaller Indian acquiring firms which are posting positive CAAR in cross border mergers.  The coefficient 
for the friendly dummy is negative and significant at the 10 percent level.  In model 2, the coefficient for 
acquirer’s market value continues to be negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The 
coefficients for other variables which were statistically significant in Table 6 appear to be insignificant in this 
Table.  The Hofstede measure is negative as before but statistically insignificant.  Thus, the effect of the 
cultural measure has a negative effect on both announcement period returns and long-term buy and hold 
returns but the effect is statistically significant only for long-term BHAR.  On the other hand, while relatively 
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larger acquiring firms post better long run buy and hold returns, it is the smaller of the acquiring firms which 
are posting higher announcement period returns.  Also, cultural distance influences the longer term returns 
with almost no statistically significant, visible effect on cumulative abnormal returns around the 
announcement of the cross border mergers.  To summarize, the economic variables we have explored as 
independent explanatory variables in this study explain the long-term BHAR but not the announcement period 
CAARs. 
 
Table 9: Multivariate regression analysis with CAAR (-2, +2) as the dependent variable 
Independent Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
CONSTANT 0.200 4.26 1.624 0.93 
FRIENDLY_DUMMY -0.035* -1.81 -0.021 -0.63 
CASH_DUMMY -0.003 -0.18 0.004 0.23 
LOG(ACQUIRER_MV) -0.013*** -3.68 -0.015*** -3.74 
AGE 0.000 -0.98 0.000 -1.01 
BUSINESS_GROUP 0.001 0.06 0.005 0.28 
RELATED   0.021 1.11 
PCI_DIFF 
  
0.351 0.49 
OPENNES_TARGET   0.068 0.85 
FOREX_VOLATILITY   0.005 0.35 
CORP_GOV_DIFF 
  
-0.162 -1.12 
LOG(HOFSTEDE)   -0.659 -0.75 
CORRUPTION_MEDIAN   0.433 0.88 
DELETERIOUS_ECONOMIC_POLICY   -0.012 -0.78 
EFFICIENCY_LEGAL_SYSTEM   -0.003 -0.58 
INADEQUATE_ACCOUNTING   0.002 0.24 
GOVERNANCE_PRACTICE   0.039 0.91 
TRADING_ACROSS_BORDERS   -0.005 -0.69 
GETTING_CREDIT   0.003 1.21 
ENFORCING_CONTRACTS   0.007 0.69 
TARGET COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS YES  YES  
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS YES  YES  
R-sq (%) 25.27  32.50  
Durbin-Watson Stat. 2.08  2.16  
No. of Observations 141   141   
*** denotes significance at 1%, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance 
at 10% level.  
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Conclusion 
The study purported to explore the effect of cultural distance on both the long run and announcement period 
performance of cross border mergers and acquisitions undertaken by Indian acquiring firms.   Indian 
acquirers are relatively new to the realm of cross border M&A and Indian acquiring firms are dominated by 
insiders and business group who are likely to invest more time and resources to due diligence and post-
merger integration strategies should they at all cross the Rubicon in terms of engaging in cross border 
acquisitions. The evidence shows that even though the long-term BHAR are negative in the aggregate, Indian 
acquiring firms have been adversely affected by cultural distance.  Greater the cultural distance between 
Indian acquiring firms and target firms in other nations, smaller is the long-term BHAR.  However, the negative 
impact of cultural distance is mitigated to a degree only when the acquiring firms belong to a business group. 
Size of the acquirers or acquiring targets in related industries do not influence the negative effects of cultural 
distance on long-term buy and hold returns. 
Independent explanatory variables included under the Opacity Index and the Ease of doing business criteria 
turn out to be statistically significant influences on the BHAR. In the aggregate, variables included in the 
study have effects on long-term BHAR but not on announcement period CAARs. We have shown that 
variables that will capture the differences between India and the foreign nations in which Indian acquiring 
firms have ventured into by way of cross-border mergers have their effects on long-term BHAR and not on 
the immediate announcement-period returns.  This is a significant contribution.  Also, we are able to expand 
on the scope of influence of cultural factors on returns to cross border acquisitions. We had hoped that given 
that Indian acquirers have experience to a large extent with cultural differences at home, will do better when 
going cross border but they evidently do not.  
Measuring cultural differences is a difficult proposition; additional research is necessary in order to identify 
other additional factors and quantify their influences on merger returns.  In particular, research into the 
observable and measurable attributes of business groups that mitigate the negative influences of cultural 
distance is warranted. Learning is an internal process that is difficult to measure and quantify. So, more 
research into the due diligence undertaken by business groups before embarking upon cross border mergers 
will provide valuable insights.  
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Appendix I 
Variable Description Source 
Acquirer BHAR Monthly Stock returns CMIE Prowess 
Acquirer Market Value (size) Natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market 
capitalization prior to the effective month of the 
acquisition 
CMIE Prowess 
Acquirer Age Years from the month the company began 
incorporated as a public company to the month of 
the acquisition 
CMIE Prowess 
Friendly Dummy  Dummy variable with value 1 for friendly acquisition 
and 0 otherwise 
Thomson One 
Cash Dummy  Dummy variable with value 1 if the acquisition 
financed by 100% Cash and 0 otherwise  
Thomson One 
Industry Relatedness Dummy variable with the value of 1 when acquirer 
and targets belong to the same industry and 0 
otherwise. 
Thomson One 
Per capita income 
difference  
 Ratio of  (Per capita GDP of acquiring nation – per 
capita GDP of target nation) to (Per capita GDP of 
acquirer nation + Per capita GDP of target nation) 
EIU Data Services 
Economic Openness of 
Target Nation 
(Target Nation's Import + Target Nation's Export) / 
Target Nation's GDP 
EIU Data Services 
Target Nation's Forex 
Volatility 
Standard deviation of Exchange rate volatility of 
target nation with the acquiring nation for the past 
36 months immediately preceding the month of 
acquisition 
EIU Data Services 
Corporate Governance 
Difference 
Acquirer Antidirector Index – Target Antidirector 
Index 
LaPorta et al., 
1998 
Hofstede Index Log of Cartesian distance between Hofstede’s for 
cultural dimensions of the two nations  
Website 
Corruption Median Index Kurtzman et al., 
2004 
Deleterious Economic Policy Index Kurtzman et al., 
2004 
Efficiency of Legal System Index Kurtzman et al., 
2004 
Inadequate Accounting Index Kurtzman et al., 
2004 
Governance Practice Index Kurtzman et al., 
2004 
Trading Across Borders  Numerical Index 1 - 190 World Bank 
Getting Credit Numerical Index 1 - 190 World Bank 
Enforcing Contracts Numerical Index 1 - 190 World Bank 
 
